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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
COURT'S POWER TO COMPENSATE ATTORNEYS
Relators were attorneys appointed to defend a pauper, by the
Knox Circuit Court, where the cause had been venued from Pike
County. The trial court made allowances for relator's services, and
upon a petition for mandamus, ordered the Knox County Auditor to
issue warrants, payment of which was refused for want of funds.
This action was to mandate the Knox County Council to appropriate
funds to pay the warrants. The mandate was proper.'
The court in the principal case declared invalid a provision of
the County Reform Act of 1889,2 which provided that no court may
validly obligate its county beyond the unexpended sum appropriated
"for the purpose of the court and for the purpose for which the obli-
gation was incurred." The effect of the statute was to restrict s ex-
penditures to the fund appropriated by the County Council, thereby
jeopardizing the accused defendant's right to counsel4 and attorney's
right to compensation for his services. 5
A conviction is invalid if the pauper criminal defendant was not
offered, and if desired, provided adequate counsel; 6 the court has the
duty, and power coequal with that duty,7 to appoint an attorney,8 but
1Knox County Council v. State ex rel McCormick, 29 N. E. (2d) 405
(Ind. 1940).
2 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) §26-527.
s It was argued that the statute does not invade the "inherent power"
of the court, but is a reasonable and valid restriction delegated
to a local representative body. But since the right to restrict is
the right to destroy and since power emanates from the constitu-
tion to the judiciary, it cannot be made a matter of legislative
discretion. Knox County Council v. State ex 'tel McCormick,
29 N. E. (2d) 405, 411 (Ind. 1940).
4 IND. CONST. Art. I, § 13. This provision or a similar one is found in
every state constitution, and in the u. S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
5 IND. CONST. Art. I, § 21. This provision is found only in the Indiana
Constitution. Lack of such a provision elsewhere is a principal
reason why the courts of only two other states, Iowa and Wiscon-
sin, allow compensation to council appointed for pauper criminal
defendants, unless authorized by statute. Hall v. Washington Coun-
ty, 2 G. Greene 473 (Iowa 1854); County of Dane v. Smith, 13
Wis. 654 (1861) (that personal services are included in the Con-
stitutional provisions that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation). The majority view requires
attorneys to give their services gratuitously as an obligation of
the profession in return for certain privileges they possess. Pardee
v. Salt Lake County, 39 Utah 482, 118 Pac. 122 (1911), 36 L.
R. A. (N.S.) 377 (1912). The Indiana court long ago discarded
this theory, describing the privileges as "empty honors" and
"odious distinctions." Webb, Auditor, v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16, 17
(1854).
6 Powell v. State, 287 U. S. 45, 84 A. L. R. 527 (1932)-; Sanchez v.
State, 199 Ind. 235, 157 N.E. 1 (1927).
7 See Gordan v. Board of Comm'rs, 52 Ind. 322, 324 (1876). Early de-
cisions rely on what is called "inherent power" of the court as
authority to appoint counsel. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854).
"Reference is made frequently to the inherent power of the courts,
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the court cannot compel an attorney to serve without compensation;"
therefore, the court must have the power, ex necessitate, to provide
for the attorney's compensation. Otherwise the appointment would
fail, unless the attorney would serve gratuitously, and it would be
impossible to carry on the prosecution constitutionally. Clearly, to
this extent the County Reform Act is unconstitutional, and the cases
supporting it are expressly overruled.10
The court did not determine whether in case of change of venue
the trial court or the court from which the case was venued should
fix and allow the attorney's compensation. That issue was not prop-
erly before the court since the appeal was not directly from the order
which allowed the fees, but was in the nature of a collateral attack
upon that order.1  There are two pertinent statutes. One, passed in
1905, provides that attorney's compensation be "settled and allowed
by the judge of the court from which the change of venue was first
granted."'1 2 The other, a 1913 act, provides that on change of venue
the costs of the trial shall be audited and allowed by the court to
which the case is venued. 13 The court states that since the latter act
is general it need not be construed as repealing the former, which
is specifically in reference to attorney fees. The court indicates there
is no objection to the legislature prescribing how compensation shall
be fixed and allowed. Thus it seems that the Act of 1905 should con-
trol. Yet it would be more consistent with the court's reasoning had
it found that the trial court, as an adjunct of the judicial power to
appoint such attorneys and do all things necessary to perform the
judicial function, also has the power to fix the compensation. The
trial court is in a better position to determine the reasonable value of
but we recognize that, in strictness, courts have no inherent powers.
The courts and the whole legal system exist only at the will of
the sovereign. The courts have only such powers as delegated at
the will of the sovereign,-in this country the sovereign people."
Fansler Some Public Reactions to Procedural Methods (1941)
16 Ind. L. J. 277. This statement by Judge Fansler, who wrote
the opinion in the principal case, was made about three months
after the case was decided. In the opinion he gave no hint of this
idea, but did refrain from using "inherent power" in any of the
court's conclusions.
8 Castro v. State 196 Ind. 385, 147 N.E. 321 (1925); Webb, Auditor v.
Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854). Later cases followed the Webb case and
in addition ordered attorney's compensation by statutory author-
ity. State ex rel Board of Comm'rs v. Miller, 107 Ind. 39, 7 N.E.
758 (1886). Because of these statutes none of the former cases
went as far as the principal case in declaring, that power to fix
and allow compensation arises out of the courts judicial function
and constitutional duties.
9 Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 (1852); IND. CONST. Art. I, §21.
10 Board of Comm'rs of Miami Co. v. Mowbray, 160 Ind. 10, 66 N.E. 46
(1903); Board of Comm'rs of Vigo Co. v. Moore, 93 Ind. App.
180, 166 N.E. 779 (1929).
"Knox County Council v. State ex rel McCormick, 29 N.E. (2d) 405,
414 (Ind. 1940); In re Board of Comm'rs of Vigo Co. v. State,
136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 603, 22 L. R. A. 398 (1893).
12 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 9-1314.
13IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 2-1417.
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the services in the court and community where they were rendered
than is the court of another county which had nothing to do with the
trial. It seems preferable, it being agreed that the county from which
the case was venued should ultimately bear the cost, to rule that the
trial court has the power to fix and allow attorney's compensation as
part of the costs of the change of venue just as all other costs of the
trial are audited and allowed. 14 This solution, which was attempted by
the trial court in the principal case, carries out the power of the court
to its logical conclusion, and conveniently adopts a practical procedure
already in common use.
W. M. B.
EVIDENCE
BLOOD-GROUPING TESTS IN EVIDENCE
Plaintiff sued defendant for maintenance of her child alleging
that defendant was the father. The defendant denied paternity and
secured a court order requiring the plaintiff and child to submit to
blood-grouping tests for comparison with defendant's blood. Order
affirmed. By authority of Fed. Rules Proe. 35 (a) the court may
order blood tests since blood-grouping is a part of physical condition.'
It is accepted by medical authorities that blood-grouping tests
can in certain cases disprove parentage. 2 But, the tests can be used
only negatively; i.e., to show non-parentage.3 When the blood groups
of one parent and the child are known, the blood group of the un-
known parent must fall into certain classes. If the putative parent's
blood does not come within one of these classes he is excluded from
possible parentage, but if it does come within one of the classes he,
among the thousands of others in that class, might be the parent. With
use -of the latest tests the average chances of ascertaining non-pater-
nity are about one in three.4
14 This procedure was approved in State ex Tel Board of Comm'rs of
Allen Co. v. Miller, 107 Ind. 39, 7 N.E. 758 (1886), where a
statute similar to IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) §2-1417 was fol-
lowed and the attorney's compensation allowed like other costs.
1 Beach v. Beach, 114 F (2d) 479 (App. D.C. 1940). Rule 35 (a)
FED. RULES CIV. PROC. provides, "In an action in which the mental
or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in
which the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical
or mental examination by a physician."
2No authority today disputes the fundamental doctrines of blood-
grouping. There may be scientific controversies over advances
and refinements that have no application here. Wiener, Deter-
mining Parentage (1935) 40 Scientific Mo. 324; Landsteiner, For-
ensic Application of the Serologic Individuality Tests, Jour. of
Amer. Med. Assn. (Oct. 6, 1934) 1041; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
(3d ed. 1940) § 165a.
8 Flippen v. Meinhold, 156 Misc. 451, 282 N.Y. Supp. 444 (N.Y. City
Cts. 1935) (Plaintiff's requesU for blood test to obtain further
proof of defendants paternity refused).
4 In 1900 Landsteiner recognized the existence of four basic blood-
groups-O, A, B and AB. In 1927 Landsteiner and Levine re-
ported two additional groups, M and N. By using both tests
